Working Papers formed on the Regulation of Incendiary Weapons
Incendiary weapons, such as napalm and thermite, have long been marked as a symbol of destruction and catastrophe in modern warfare. Although a formal banning was put in place on the use of incendiary weapons against civilians in 1980, several countries and governing factions have since begun using white phosphorous, which has similar effects to other fire-producing weapons, under the guise of “smoke producing agents”.
In recent years, more international pressure has been laid upon this issue and many in the global community have urged the United Nations (UN) to meet and discuss the 1980 mandate which has been repeatedly abused. The UN committee on Disarmament has now decided to answer these calls and has formed a meeting to discuss the regulation of these weapons.
The committee has an air of division, evidenced by the sheer number of working papers circulating the room. In the midst of group discussions via the passing of notes, the delegation of Israel rises to speak on the components of their working paper stating, “seeing [as] there are many papers being made, it is important that we reach a consensus soon, and the delegation of Israel does believe working paper 1.3 is the most comprehensive,” he also states, “That being said, the other sponsors and I would appreciate your input on improving our paper to cover a broader range of issues. Our goal is avoiding loopholes, and that can only be achieved through specificity”.
Next, the delegation of Pakistan rises to the podium, saying that he believes “working paper 1.2 clearly has the most support out of all the proposed working papers. Therefore, it should be the sole paper in discussion and passed once we get to that stage”.
Referring to a specific clause in 1.2 in which its effectiveness relies in large part on the promise of individual countries to comply, the delegation of Sweden asks, “How can you be so sure that the word of these countries is enough to prevent them from using these weapons anyways? Is their word really enough to secure any change?” A ramble of response is received by the delegation of Pakistan, but attention is soon diverted to the block working on paper 1.3 that had just walked back into the room.
The delegation of Pakistan sits down, and the delegation of Russia, another sponsor of working paper 1.2, stands up to update the committee on their paper and any changes made. He speaks of passing in tandem with papers 1.1 and 1.3, a stark change in mindset from fellow sponsor Pakistan, who expressed his wish for 1.2 and only 1.2 to be passed. The extent of the division within this committee presents itself in full clarity through this contradiction, and it is now apparent just how much work and adjustment is needed before this committee may entertain the notion of passing any papers.
In recent years, more international pressure has been laid upon this issue and many in the global community have urged the United Nations (UN) to meet and discuss the 1980 mandate which has been repeatedly abused. The UN committee on Disarmament has now decided to answer these calls and has formed a meeting to discuss the regulation of these weapons.
The committee has an air of division, evidenced by the sheer number of working papers circulating the room. In the midst of group discussions via the passing of notes, the delegation of Israel rises to speak on the components of their working paper stating, “seeing [as] there are many papers being made, it is important that we reach a consensus soon, and the delegation of Israel does believe working paper 1.3 is the most comprehensive,” he also states, “That being said, the other sponsors and I would appreciate your input on improving our paper to cover a broader range of issues. Our goal is avoiding loopholes, and that can only be achieved through specificity”.
Next, the delegation of Pakistan rises to the podium, saying that he believes “working paper 1.2 clearly has the most support out of all the proposed working papers. Therefore, it should be the sole paper in discussion and passed once we get to that stage”.
Referring to a specific clause in 1.2 in which its effectiveness relies in large part on the promise of individual countries to comply, the delegation of Sweden asks, “How can you be so sure that the word of these countries is enough to prevent them from using these weapons anyways? Is their word really enough to secure any change?” A ramble of response is received by the delegation of Pakistan, but attention is soon diverted to the block working on paper 1.3 that had just walked back into the room.
The delegation of Pakistan sits down, and the delegation of Russia, another sponsor of working paper 1.2, stands up to update the committee on their paper and any changes made. He speaks of passing in tandem with papers 1.1 and 1.3, a stark change in mindset from fellow sponsor Pakistan, who expressed his wish for 1.2 and only 1.2 to be passed. The extent of the division within this committee presents itself in full clarity through this contradiction, and it is now apparent just how much work and adjustment is needed before this committee may entertain the notion of passing any papers.